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Reframing the Proportionality
Principle
Michael A. Newton*
ABSTRACT

Proportionalityfunctions as oneof the most important legal
constraints applicable to the conduct of hostilities. In that
context, this short essay discusses the commonly encountered
misapplications of Cicero's classic sentiment that "salus
populwe supremus est lexl . . . silent enim leges inter armes."
Rather than serving as a necessary basis for a positive
articulationof lawful force as an exception to the norm, jus in
bello proportionality delineates the outer boundaries of the
commander's appropriatediscretion. The mere invocation of jus
in bello proportionality cannot become an effective extension of
asymmetric combat power by artificially crippling combatant
capabilities. This essay ends by framing the modern content of
the proportionalityprinciple that remains fully applicable as a
matter of law even during in extremis situations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Ours

is

the

"era

of proportionality"

in

the

sense

that

proportionality is an integral aspect of legal and moral discourse in
every effective legal system. 2 Within the law of war, termed jus in
bello, proportionality is centrally important to achieving military
efficiency and moral fairness. Combatants have affirmative rights
under interconnected jus in bello principles, yet these rights carry
correlative duties requiring that the loss of lives must be offset by
equally serious matters if the conduct of war is to be justified.
Military commanders see proportionality as an essential element of
professional ethos that provides the necessary latitude to accomplish
their strategic and tactical mandates. Proportionality simultaneously
imposes concrete restraints over the conduct of armed conflicts when
properly applied.
Proportionality may well be the most controversial imperative in
waging modern conflicts from the legal, moral, and political
perspectives. This is particularly problematic for war-fighters given
the emergence of a globalized system of international accountability.
The adversary's ability to broadcast (or perhaps fabricate) allegations
of inappropriate conduct worldwide adds an unprecedented level of
difficulty
to
modern
proportionality
determinations.
The
demonstrable gap between internationally accepted articulations of
proportionality and its perceived application is not inevitable. The
mere invocation of proportionality cannot become an effective
extension of asymmetric combat power by artificially crippling
combatant capabilities.
Rather than serving as a necessary basis for a positive
articulation of lawful force as an exception to the norm, jus in bello
proportionality delineates the outer boundaries of the commander's
appropriate discretion. The difficulty in , practice is that its
parameters remain bounded by contextual challenges in every
instance. Aharon Barak, of the Israeli Supreme Court, summarized
this aspect of proportionality and its interrelationship with
appropriate oversight as follows:
The court will ask itself only if a reasonable military commander could have
made the decision which was made. If the answer is yes, the court will not
exchange the military commander's security discretion with the security
discretion of the court. Judicial review regarding military means to be taken is
within the regular review of reasonableness. . . . [Tihe question is not what I

2.
See generally, e.g., AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012).
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would decide in a given circumstance, but rather whether the decision that the
military commander made is a decision that a reasonable military commander
was permitted to make. In that subject, special weight is to be granted to the
military opinion of the officials who bear responsibility for security. . . . Who
decides about proportionality? Is it a military decision to be left to the
reasonable application of the military, or a legal decision within the discretion
of the judges? Our answer is that the proportionality of military means used in
the fight against terror is a legal question left to the judges . . . . Proportionality
is not a standard of precision; at times there are a number of ways to fulfill its
conditions . . . a zone of proportionality is created; it is the borders of that zone
3
that the court guards.

The precise parameters of this zone of proportionality are very
much in dispute amidst the complexity of modern armed conflicts and
the rise of a globalized media. This short essay accordingly seeks to
preserve the proportionality principle while ensuring its appropriate
role within larger debates over the role for military force and the
responsibilities of ethical war-fighters. It will, in seriatum, address
confusions that cloud the application of proportionality, describe its
commonalities as applied across varying fields of usage, and conclude
by reviewing its normative content. The next Part addresses a
recurring and oft-repeated misunderstanding of the relationship
between the rule of law and the onset of armed conflict as a condition
of human conduct. That understanding in turn necessitates
consideration in Part III of the broader implications of the
proportionality principle as it straddles diverse domains and usages.
Part IV outlines the normative parameters that inform invocation of
proportionality as an aspect of military practices.

II. CORRECTING CICERO

Embodying the classical conception of hostilities, Hugo Grotius
quoted the Roman philosopher Cicero for the proposition that Inter
bellum ac pacis nihil est medium (e.g., "there is no medium between
war and peace"). 4 This archaic conception of conflict led to sharp
intellectual cleavages drawn between the Law of War and the Law of
Peace.5 The conception of a legal firewall by which the normally
prevailing body of law is automatically displaced by a wilder and

Aharon Barak, President (ret'd) Supreme Court of Isr., Address at the Jim
3.
Shasha Center of Strategic Studies of the Federmann School for Public Policy and
Government of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Dec. 18, 2007).
4.

HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 832 (Francis W. Kelsey

trans., Oxford Clarendon Press 1925) (1625). Modern translation available online at
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/grotius-the-rights-of-war-and-peace-2005-ed-vol-3-bookiii [https://perma.cclZK8X-EGU8] (archived Mar. 27, 2018).
Notice that the very title of Hugo Grotius' classic work framed the issue in
5.
precisely this manner because that was the intellectual and philosophical fissure that
he sought to explicate.
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impliedly non-legal set of norms is often said to originate some two
thousand years ago from the mind of the famed orator Cicero. The
philosophical and legal notion that antagonists may properly discount
legal constraints when facing in extremis situations is captured in the
oft-repeated sentiment from Cicero that "salus populwe supremus est
lex 6 . . . silent enim leges inter armes."'7 The quote is often (incorrectly)
attributed to say that "in times of war, the law falls silent."8
The phrase has been invoked to argue that conduct that would
otherwise be unlawful may be permissible if it is in furtherance of a
public good, 9 or in defining times of peace (the courts are open and
available for recourse) versus war (the courts are closed). 10 Some
early British cases quoted Cicero in embracing the idea that military
matters fall outside the jurisdiction of common law courts." Courts in
different jurisdictions repeatedly rilied upon this notion during the
Civil War and Reconstruction era cases, most famously in the
government's arguments in favor of suspending habeas corpus in Ex
parte Milligan. In modern times, the phrase is more often used in
discourse related to civil liberties during investigation and
prosecution of terrorists.
Heated debates over rejection of civil liberties during recent
armed conflicts rest on the fullest implications of the misquoted
phrase. Justice Scalia's dissent in Hamdi v. Rumseld represents one
of the more widely known recent incantations:
Many think it not only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty give way to
security in times of national crisis-that, at the extremes of.military exigency,
inter arma silent leges. Whatever the general merits of the view that war

6.
CICERO De Legibus, supra note 1.
7.
CICERO, Pro Milone, IV, xi.
8.
See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Dwight D. Opperman Lecture: Remarks of
the Chief Justice of the United States, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 201, 205--208 (1999) ("Here we
have an illustration of an old maxim of Roman law-Inter Arma Silent Leges-which
loosely translated means that in time of war the laws are silent. All during the Civil
War the courts were unable or unwilling to ride herd on the Lincoln administration's
policies which seriously interfered with civil liberty. Only after the end of the war was
a decision handed down which upheld that liberty . . . This is not necessarily a
condemnation. Both Lincoln and FDR fit into this mold. The courts, for their part, have
largely reserved the decisions favoring civil liberties in wartime to be handed down
after the war was over. Again, we see the truth in the maxim Inter Arma Silent
Leges-in time of war the laws are silent . . . perhaps we can accept the proposition
that though the laws are not silent in wartime, they speak with a muted voice.").
9.
See, e.g., Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257, 261 (N.Y. 1815) (arguing, in a case
challenging the detention of a Scottish individual, that in times of war necessity and
the public good may justify certain acts in accordance with Cicero's maxim); see also
York & Fenderson v. Z.M.L. Jeffreys & Sons, 109 S.E. 80, 82 (N.C. 1921) ("It is the
inexorable law that regard be had to the public welfare, and, in times of war and peril,
to the public safety.").
10.
Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 378-79 (1863).
11.
See Sir G. E. Hodgkinson, Knt. v. Fernie and Another, 2 Common Bench
Reports (New Series) 415, 140 E.R. 479 (1857); Barwis v. Keppel, 95 E.R. 831, 833, 2
Wilson, K. B. 314 (1766).
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silences law or modulates its voice, that view has no place in the interpretation
and application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in a
manner that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it. Because
the Court has proceeded to meet the current emergency in a manner the
12
Constitution does not envision. I respectfully dissent.

When applied to the law of war domain, Clausewitz famously
drew upon the mindset generally attributed to Cicero to postulate
that:
war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit in the application of force ...
Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly
worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely
weaken it. . . . [In fact] kind-hearted people might . . . think that there was
some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without bloodshed, and
might imagine that this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds,
it is a fallacy that must be exposed; war is such a dangerous business that the
mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst .... 13

As recently as January 2018, a sitting judge on the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Court invoked this notion to
infer in open court that the appeal of Jean Pierre Bemba from his
conviction for war crimes might be unfounded. 14 However, despite its
repeated incantations, the argument that Cicero advocated
suspension of applicable law in times of warfare is unfounded.
Few lawyers have distinguished the popular mischaracterization
from what Cicero actually said in its context. Cicero was arguing in
defense of his close friend, Milo, who had been set upon by armed
brigands under the leadership of a political foe while travelling. On
trial for the killing of Clodius, Cicero argued (not unlike other defense
attorneys through the centuries) that a limited right of self-defense
displaces other norms that might otherwise prohibit killing. 15 Relying
on this theory of self-defense under circumstances that rendered the
killing understandable and perhaps even laudable, the relevant
portion of Cicero's oration reads as follows:
There is then, judges, a law of this kind-not written, but inborn-which we
have apprehended, drank in and extracted from nature herself; in conformity to
which we have not been taught, but made; in which we have not been educated,

12.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75, 77 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret,
13.
trans., Princeton University Press 1976) (1833).
14.
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08,
Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 21, 2016).
See Mark Edward Clark & James S. Ruebel, Philosophy and Rhetoric in
15.
Cicero's "ProMilone", 128 RHEINISCHES MUSEUM FOR PHILOLOGIE, Neue Folge 57, 65
(1985) ("The notion of justifiable self-defense was of course thoroughly accepted at
Rome long before the advent of Stoicism, but the two ideologies converge conveniently
here; somewhat later on, Cicero appeals again to this doctrine, in terms which ring
increasingly Stoic.").
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but ingrained; and this law is, that if our life fall under peril from any ambush,
violence, or weapon, whether of robbers or of personal enemies, recourse should
be had to every honorable means to safety. For the laws are silent in the midst
of arms. 1 6

With respect to jus in bello, the takeaway is plain. Of course the
law applies, but it does so in modified form and with an entirely
different set of normative benchmarks. Grotius implicitly recognized
this truism in the Prolegomena to his classic work by noting that "[i]f
'laws are silent among arms,' this is true only of civil laws and of laws
relating to the judiciary and the practices of peacetime, and not of the
other laws which are perpetual and appropriate to all circumstances."
Ironically enough, the U.S. Department of Defense Manual as
modified in December 2016 implicitly reinforces the suspicion arising
from the frequent misunderstanding of Cicero's maxim that jus in
bello serves as a convenient rationale to undermine rights that would
otherwise be sacrosanct. The Manual's formulation that lex specialis
law of war requires other bodies of law either to remain fully
subordinated to jus in bello norms or be interpreted in such a manner
as to remain consistent with accepted law of war principles does not
fully accord with accepted international law.' 7 Proportionality serves
as a bridging principle that preserves the right to life within the
context of all armed conflicts. From the perspective of normally
applicable human rights norms, the very idea that proportionality
affirmatively countenances the deaths of civilians or others not
participating in conflict at the precise moment of their demise seems
heretical. Nevertheless, when applied appropriately, the principle of
proportionality operates in precisely that manner.
Phrased with slightly more precision, the jus in bello concept of
proportionality balances military expediency and larger military
interests (such as ensuring strategic or tactical victory, preserving
the lives of friendly forces, and bringing the conflict to its optimal and
swiftest conclusion) against countervailing humanitarian interests.
As properly understood and applied, jus in bello proportionality does
not faintly resemble a lawless invocation of convenience; by
definition, it rebuts those who would inappropriately argue that the
very nature of war negates utility of a carefully constructed legal
regime. This conclusion logically necessitates examination of the
similarities between the jus in bello law of proportionality and the
application of the same terminology in a variety of other legal and
litigation contexts. Part III will address those commonalities.

16.
17.

Fremont Contract Cases, 2 Ct. Cl. 1, 25 n.1 (1866).
Michael A. Newton, The DoD Law of War Manual as Applied to Coalition

Command and Control, in MICHAEL A. NEWTON, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL: COMMENTARY AND CRITIQUE (forthcoming 2018).
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III. COMMONALITIES AMONG DIFFERENT USES OF PROPORTIONALITY

Proportionality is an imperfect tool, but it is nonetheless
18
essential in a wide variety of legal and philosophical disciplines.
Despite its linguistic consistency, the principle of proportionality is
not a homogenous terminological template in usage across different
disciplines.
Proportionality provides a standard of non-arbitrariness by
which to assess compelling operational, legal, or moral imperatives
but operates against the backdrop of other applicable norms. Damage
to civilians during military operations that is not grounded firmly in
accompanying military necessity would by definition not be subject to
proportionality analysis.
Similar to usages in other areas of international practice,
proportionality as applied must remain practicable because "rules
that are incompatible with all effective military action risk being
19
ignored and, thereby, not preventing any harm from occurring."
Thus, the starting point for an affirmative vision of proportionality as
a viable jus in bello precept is identifying its points of commonality
across disciplines. This is rather like the process of identifying
specific comparators when doing fingerprint analysis. After
discussing these shared traits, Part IV will describe the contours of
jus in bello proportionality as it has been defined.
A. The Pervasive Use of Negative Phraseology
Because proportionality provides an indispensable balancing
function, yet defies precise and overarching description, it is most
frequently expressed in the negative rather than the positive form as
a rule of decision. There is no area in which the law of proportionality
is defined with clarity on an abstract basis due to its inherently
contextual nature. This is foundational because proportionality
always involves competing factors and shifting relationships amongst
relative values. The actual content of proportionality in any given
context is irreducible to a soundbite or easily extrapolated judicial
test. Therefore, as a logical extension, it is described in the negative.
In human rights parlance, for example, governments may
restrict the rights conveyed by the European Convention for the

18.

MICHAEL A. NEWTON & LARRY MAY, PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 28-61 (2014) (discussing the multiplicity of applications for the term
'proportionality' in, inter alia, trade, bioethics, countermeasures, jus ad bellum, jus in
bello, maritime delineation, and criminal sentencing).
On the need to construct enforceable rules of IHL, see Janina Dill & Henry
19.
Shue, Limiting the Killing in War: Military Necessity and the St. Petersburg
Assumption, 26 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 311, 324 (2012).
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms only when
"the means employed are not disproportionate."2 0
Similarly, the International Court of Justice relied upon the
proportionality principle as the rule of decision in its first
environmental law ruling in the Case Concerning GabcikovoNagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)21 over the construction and
operation of dams on the river Danube. In finding in Hungary's favor
on the Slovak dam project, the court held that Slovakia's
countermeasure to Hungary's breach of a prior treaty "failed to
respect the proportionality which is required by international law"
and was consequently unlawful. 22 Slovakia's countermeasure to
Hungary's breach of the 1977 treaty was "not proportionate."2 3
In his dissent, Judge Vereschetin more clearly described
proportionality as a "basic condition for the lawfulness of a
countermeasure," which is to be determined "in the circumstances of
the case." 24 He conceded that "there is no uniformity . . . in the

practice or the doctrine [in international law] as to the formulation of
the principle, the strictness or flexibility of the principle and the
criteria on the basis of which proportionality should be assessed." As
a result,
reference to equivalence or proportionality in the narrow sense . . . is unusual
in State practice . . . [which] is why in the literature and arbitral awards it is
suggested that the lawfulness of countermeasures must be assessed by the
application
of such negative criteria as "not [being]
manifestly
disproportionate," or "clearly disproportionate," "pas hors de toute proportion"
[quoting the original French text] .... 25

This practice in other arenas mirrors the design of the jus in
bello framework. The ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I
notes with some understatement that the language applicable to
precautions in the attack "gave rise to lengthy discussions and

20.
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, App. No. 9267, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep.
20, 23, ¶ 52 (1987). The same phraseology appears in ICSID decisions as well; one
tribunal compared the relative costs incurred by the defendant against the damage
caused to the Russian budget with the conclusion that "[t]he sequestration orders were
legitimate and not disproportionate." Spyridon Roussalis (Claimant) v. Romania
(Respondent), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 (Award), ¶ 520 (Dec. 7, 2011) (emphasis
added), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0723.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L2RW-MHD7] (arheived Feb. 17, 2018).
21.
Press Release, International Court of Justice, Case concerning Gab~ikovoNagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) Judgment, Press Release 1997/10 (Sept. 25,
1997)
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6M3W-Z5LW] (archived Feb. 17, 2018).
22.
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia),
1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 1 85 (Sept. 25).
23.
Id. ¶¶ 85, 87.
24.
Id. at 223 (Vereschetin, J., dissenting).
25.
Id.
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negotiations among delegations." 26 The 1973 ICRC working draft of
what became the proportionality provisions in the 1977 Protocol (i.e.,
Articles 51(5)(b), 57(2) and 85(3)) cautioned that lawful attacks were
those deemed "not disproportionate to the direct and substantial
military advantage anticipated."2 7
Geoffrey Best noted that although the textual incarnations of
proportionality came after more than a century of development
within the field that gap should not be attributed to unfamiliarity
with the basic precepts of the precautions expected to be taken by
attackers and defenders alike. In his words, the developmentally
delayed formulation of the treaty language was "because it was
thought to be too slippery and in its potential implications
embarrassing to commit to a set form of words." 28 Thus, the discretion
given to decision makers by the widespread use of the negative form
"not disproportionate" reflects the inability of drafters to define the
term "proportionate" as a rigid template. Indeterminacy of its precise
application is baked into the very design of the proportionality
prificiple.
B. Breadth of PermissibleDiscretion
By extension, proportionality is a comparative exercise involving
dissimilar values. As Professor Michael Schmitt points out, "How
does one, for instance, compare tanks destroyed to the number of
serious civilian injuries or deaths caused by attacks upon them?"2 9
The use of markedly strong modifiers is a core truism that recurs in
virtually every contextual application. Judicial decisions around the
world and in a variety of usages evaluate the actions of litigants by
considering whether conduct "grossly"30 or "markedly" or "strikingly"
This elevated threshold
proportionality.
or "plainly" lacked
simultaneously empowers actors by recognizing the rightful
boundaries of their discretion even as it places the burden of proof
onto the party attempting to overturn or discredit the decision.
Judge Vereschetin's observation quoted above that international
practice requires a finding that a particular countermeasure is
"manifestly" or "clearly" out of balance is completely accurate. Such
qualifiers span courts and contexts. The European Court of Justice
upheld a series of EU agricultural directives in July 2012, reasoning

26.

Sandoz,

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977

Christophe

Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann

eds.,

1987)

¶

2204 (Yves

[hereinafter

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].
Id.
27.
28.
GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAw SINCE 1945, at 323 (1994).

Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE

Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006).
R. v. Khawaja, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555, 584 (Can.).
30.

&

29.

BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 293 (Susan C. Breau
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that "notwithstanding the fact that they may involve adverse
economic consequences for some traders, [the Directives] do not
appear, in the light of the economic interests of those traders, to
be manifestly disproportionatein relation to the aim pursued."3 1
Similarly, in Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for
Transport, the disputed EU action was upheld because a "measure
adopted in the exercise of that discretion, breaches the principle of
proportionality only if it is manifestly unsuitable for achieving the
objective pursued by the competent body, if there are clearly less
onerous measures which are equally effective or if the measures
taken are clearly out of proportionto the objectives pursued." 32
Within the jus in bello realm, the United Kingdom included an
express reservation to the grave breaches provisions of Protocol I,
Articles 85(3)(c) and 56.33 The reservation rejected an absolute
standard of protection for "works or installations containing
dangerous forces" because states merely must "avoid severe collateral
losses among the civilian population." 34 Rather than an absolute bar,
a substantial degree of property damage or loss of life might well be
permissible.
The ICTY has indirectly reinforced this higher threshold by
repeatedly declining to convict perpetrators on the basis of post hoc
evaluations of their proportionality analysis. In particular, Appeals
judges overturned the conviction of Croatian Generals Ante Gotovina
and Mladen Marka6 by holding that the Trial Chamber improperly
created an evidentiary standard, which then became the basis for
inferring disproportionate and indiscriminate artillery attacks, using
its own judicial construct as the dispositive principle.3 5 Though the
majority decision generated vigorous dissents that are "perhaps
unprecedented in international tribunal history decision[s]," the
Appeals Chamber unanimously found that the judicially fabricated
standard was inappropriate largely because it inappropriately
weighed the permissible discretion accorded to General Gotovina. 36
By noticeable contrast, other ICTY opinions based liability on an
inference of direct intention to conduct prohibited attacks on civilians
rather than second guessing a commander's proportionality

31.
Case C-59/11, Ass'n Kokopelli v. Graines Baumaux SAS, 2012, ¶¶ 68-69
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsfdocid=118143&doclang-EN
(emphasis added).
32.
Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for Transp., 2010
E.C.R. 1-07027, 1 57 (emphasis added).
33.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), of
June 1977, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
Id.
34.
35.
Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeal Judgment, 1 4967 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012).
36.
Julian Elderfield, Introductory Note to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia: The Prosecutorv. Gotovina et al., 52 I.L.M. 72, 72 (2013).
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assessments. Avoiding what would be a sticky proportionality
analysis, the Blaikid Trial Chamber used the principle of distinction
to conclude that an attack against civilians was criminal if it was
"conducted intentionally in the knowledge, or when it was impossible
not to know, that civilians or civilian property were being targeted
not through military necessity." 37 On this score, the authoritative
ICRC Commentary recognizes that in these subjective evaluations
"the interpretation must above all be a question of common sense and
good faith for military commanders. In every attack they must
carefully weigh the humanitarian and military interests at stake."38
Reinforcing the need for respecting the zone of permissible discretion,
the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign in Kosovo observed that:
It is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat
commander would assign the same relative values to military advantage and to
injury to noncombatants. Further, it is unlikely that military commanders with
different doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience or
national military histories would always agree in close cases. It is suggested
that the determination of relative values must be that of the "reasonable
39
military commander."

Lastly, proportionality cannot be encapsulated without reference
to a larger totality of the circumstances examination. Proportionality
is never a simple extrapolation or mathematical theorem. Media
accounts that reduce military operations to numerical comparisons of
casualty figures create misimpressions over the nature of
proportionality. For example, one account of the sinking of the
Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands War
commented that the deaths of 368 seamen "seems all out of
proportion to the threat posed by the ship at the time of the attack.
Was this an instance of an excessive or disproportionate use of
force?" 40 This simple numerical comparison is qualified as only
presenting the appearance of disproportionality, yet it incorrectly
reinforces the erroneous impression that jus in bello proportionality is
grounded in the immediate tactical threat posed by a particular
military target.

Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 180 (Int'l Crim.
37.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); see also Prosecutor v. Gali6, Case No.
IT-98-29-A, Judgment, ¶ 140 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30,
2006).
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supranote 25, at 683-84.
38.
See FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO
39.
REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (June 13, 2000), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1258, 1271 (2000). For analysis, see

Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 87 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 445 (2005).
40.
A.J. COATES, THE ETHICS OF WAR 209-10 (1997).
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The proportionality principle unquestionably forms an essential
component of the backbone of the law of armed conflict (lex lata). The
standard for imposing criminal sanctions for violations of jus in bello
proportionality is "clearly excessive" when assessed against the
broader
"concrete
and
direct
overall
military
advantage
anticipated." 4 1 Yoram Dinstein is surely correct that "[m]any people
confuse excessive with extensive." 4 2 Thus, damage to civilians or their
property can "be exceedingly extensive without being excessive,
simply because the military advantage anticipated is of paramount
importance." 43 Proportionality is not a prohibition on extensive
damage or loss of civilian life if they are not clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,
assuming that the value of the military advantage is itself very high.

IV. NORMATIVE CONTENT OF THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE

The principle of proportionality developed as one of the primary
mechanisms to protect non-combatants during armed conflicts. The
word "proportionality" does not appear as such in any treaty text, but
its essence is suffused through a number of key provisions. The
formal articulations of proportionality within the bounds of treaty law
represent the pinnacle of the developmental arc of law as nations
sought to negotiate legal documents to address the moral
complexities of combat while extending appropriate protections to
civilians and other protected persons.
International law restricts the class of persons against whom
violence may be applied during armed conflicts, even as it bestows
affirmative rights to wage war in accordance with accepted legal
restraints. Because of the central importance of these categorizations,
the standards for ascertaining the legal line between lawful and

41.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(iv), opened
for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
42.

LEGAL AND

ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO'S Kosovo CAMPAIGN, Part III:

Targeting, in 78 INT'L. L. STUD. 135, 215 (Andru Wall ed., 2002).
43.
Id. Gary Solis describes the instance where "bombing of an important army
or naval installation (like a naval shipyard) where there are hundreds or even
thousands of civilian employees need not be abandoned merely because of the risk to
these civilians."

GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 280 (2010); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua, Nicar. v. U.S., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, 1986
I.C.J. 14, T 9 (June 27) ("To the extent that proportionality of defensive measures is
required - a question examined below - in their nature, far from being
disproportionate to the acts against which they are a defence, the actions of the United
States are strikingly proportionate.")(emphasis added).
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unlawful participants in conflict provided the intellectual impetus for
the evolution of the entire field of jus in bello. 44
From the outset, states sought to prescribe the conditions under
which they owed particular persons affirmative legal protections
45
derived from the laws and customs of war. The recurring refrain in
negotiations can be described as "to whom do we owe such
protections?" The constant effort to be as precise as possible in
describing the classes of persons entitled to legal protections was
essential because the same criteria prescribe the select class who may
lawfully conduct hostilities with an expectation of immunity. The
declarative humanitarian limitation that the "right of belligerents to
46
is one of the
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited"
organizing principles that unifies the framework of the law of armed
conflict and provides the intellectual underpinnings of the
proportionality principle.
Persons outside the framework of international humanitarian
law who commit warlike acts do not enjoy immunity from prosecution
and are therefore common criminals subject to prosecution for their
actions. 4 7 The imperative that logically follows is that the right of
non-belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is nonexistent.
Those persons governed by the law of armed conflict derive rights and
benefits but are also subject to bright line obligations. Prisoners of
war, for example, enjoy legal protection vis-d-vis their captors;
because they are legally protected, they have no right to commit
48
Yet, lawful combatants become
"violence against life and limb."
"war criminals" only when their actions transgress the established
49
Treaty-based
boundaries of the laws and customs of war.

The field is frequently described as international humanitarian law. This
44.
vague rubric is increasingly used as shorthand to refer to the body of treaty norms that
apply in the context of armed conflict as well as the less distinct internationally
accepted customs related to the treatment of persons.
BEST, supra note 27, at 128-33.
45.
46.
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
1907, Annex art. 22, Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF,

DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73, 77 (3d ed. 2000).
In a classic treatise, Julius Stone described the line between lawful
47.
participants in conflict and unprivileged or "unprotected" combatants as follows:
The . . . distinction draws the line between those personnel who, on capture, are
entitled under international law to certain minimal treatment as prisoners of war,
and those not entitled to such protection. "Non-combatants" who engage in
hostilities are one of the classes deprived of such protection . . . Such unprivileged
belligerents, though not condemned by international law, are not protected by it,
but are left to the discretion of the belligerent threatened by their activities.
JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 549 (1954).

See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
48.
93, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
See Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmuh Kaseem and Others, in 42 INT'L
49.
L. REP. 470, 481 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1971) ("Similarly, combatants who are members
of the armed forces, but do not comply with the minimum qualifications of belligerents
or are proved to have broken other rules of warfare, are war criminals as such .... );
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articulations of proportionality in turn do not redefine these basic
tenets. Simply put, the proportionality principle is not implicated
when combatant activities or the lawful conduct of hostilities have no
effects on persons or property entitled to protections under the
established lex lata during armed conflicts.
A. Additional Protocol I Formulations
The idea of proportionality operates in the shadow of Article 51
of Protocol I, which in its initial clause implements the categorical
admonition that:
[T]he civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection
against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this
protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applicable rules of
international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.

This entitlement functions properly only against the backdrop of
the modern principle of distinction, or discrimination as the
philosophers call it, captured in the ringing imperative of Article 48:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
military objectives.

The negotiating text that became Article 51 in the final adoption
of Protocol I was adopted by a vote of seventy-seven votes in favor,
one against (France), and sixteen abstentions. French opposition was
premised on the position that the very complexity of the
proportionality test would seriously hamper military operations
against an invader and prejudice the exercise of the sovereign and
inherent right of defense as recognized by Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. The French delegation pointed out that it would be
difficult to define the dispositive limits of a "specific military
objective."5 0 Even the phrasing of Article 51 indicates that
proportionality is to be considered as only one piece, albeit perhaps
the most prominent piece, of an interconnected mosaic of protections
for the civilian population. The overarching prohibition is followed by
the more specific and pointed application in Article 51(4) that
"indiscriminate attacks are prohibited."

Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 85 ("Without prejudice to the application of the
Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of these instruments shall be
regarded as war crimes.").
50.
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts,
Geneva (1974-1977), Vol. 3, 161-62 (1978) (referencing concerns raised by the Polish
delegation among others).
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Article 51(5) of Protocol I then defines indiscriminate attacks,
using the non-exhaustive caveat that "among others the following
types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate":
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.

This language of "incidental loss of civilian life . . . excessive in
relation to . . . the military advantage anticipated" is the core of the
modern proportionality conversation. The balancing test of Article
51(5)(b) represents the modern basis for assessing a proportionate,
hence permissible, attack. When the composite snippets of Protocol I
are consolidated and considered as a whole, the tenets of
proportionality change from discordant pieces into a clear roadmap
that can help military decision makers accurately judge the
lawfulness of their conduct and effectively protect civilians.
In addition to the precepts embedded in Articles 51 and 48 of
Protocol I of 1977, described above, Articles 57 and 58 further
crystallized the concept of proportionality: Article 57 restates the
baseline of protections enjoyed by civilians at all times and all places.
Article 57 imposes the foundational duty to take "feasible precautions
in the choice of means and methods of attack" and then requires that
an attacker must "refrain from deciding to launch any attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
51
advantage anticipated."
These provisions must be understood in light of state practice.
The governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain,
Italy, Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, Germany, and Canada each
published a virtually identical reservation with respect to Articles 51
and 57 as they acceded to Protocol I.52 The overwhelming weight of
the reservations made clear that state practice did not intend to put
the warfighter into a straightjacket of rigid orthodoxy. The New
Zealand reservation for example (virtually identical to those of other
states listed above) reads as follows:
In relation to paragraph 5 (b) of Article 51 and to paragraph 2 (a) (iii) of Article
57, the Government of New Zealand understands that the military advantage

Protocol I, supra note 32, arts. 57, 58 (obligating parties to abide by the
51.
specified precautionary measures "to the maximum extent feasible."
The numerous texts of state declarations expressing similar views using
52.
almost identical language are available at Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries,
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROss, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihlibl.nsf/
States.xsp? xp viewStates=XPagesNORMStatesParties&xptreatySelected=470 (last
visited Feb. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cclX6YE-4AM6] (archived Feb. 2, 2018).
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anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated
from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular
parts of that attack and that the term "military advantage" involves a variety
of considerations, including the security of attacking forces. It is further the
understanding of the Government of New Zealand that the term "concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated", used in Articles 51 and 57, means a
bona fide expectation that the attack will make a relevant and proportional
contribution to the objective of the military attack involved.

Secondly, in reaching the legally defensible assessment of
proportionality, the perspective of the commander (or warfighting
decision maker) is entitled to deference based on the subjective
perspectives prevailing at the time. The Italian declaration with
respect to Protocol I states that:
[In] relation to Articles 51 to 58 inclusive, the Italian Government understands
that military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon
or executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their
assessment of the information from all sources which is available to them at
53
the relevant time.

This understanding is replicated in a number of other state
pronouncements. Another reservation from the government of
Austria declares that "Article 57, paragraph 2, of Protocol I will be
applied on the understanding that, with respect to any decision taken
by a military commander, the information actually available at the
time of the decision is determinative." 54 Thus, modern incantations
that would make proportionality into a binding straitjacket only
deduced on the basis of post hoc assessments are erroneous.
B. The ICC Crime of DisproportionateAttacks
With respect to determining the contours of any chargeable
offenses related to proportionality, the formulations of Protocol I have
been superseded by the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. At the time of this writing, 123 States

53.
Italy's Declarations at the time of Ratification of the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 1977, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument
&documentId=E2F248CE54CFO9B5C1256402003FB443 (last visited Feb. 2, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/CL9Z-8V5D] (archived Feb. 2, 2018).
54.
Austria's Declarations at the time of Ratification of the Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 1977, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf./Notification.xsp?action=open
Document&documentld=C5CD2O1B43C3E56AC1256402003FB262 (last visited Feb. 2,
2018) [https://perma.cc/4NZS-EPHV] (archived Feb. 2, 2018).
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Party5 5 have adopted the statute as a binding treaty. In contrast, the
Elements of Crimes required by Article 9 were adopted by the
consensus of all states, to include the United States, China, and other
major non-States Party. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) describes proportionality in
a manner consistent with modern state practice following the
adoption of Protocol I as:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or
widespread, long-term severe damage to the natural environment which would
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
56
advantage anticipated. (emphasis added to show contrast to Protocol I text)

In addition, the Elements of Crimes (adopted by consensus of all
states as mentioned above) included a key footnote that reads as
follows:
The expression "concrete and direct overall military advantage" refers to a
military advantage that is foreseeable by the perpetrator at the relevant time.
Such advantage may or may not be temporally or geographically related to the
object of the attack. The fact that this crime admits the possibility of lawful
incidental injury and collateral damage does not in any way justify any
violation of the law applicable in armed conflict. It does not address
justifications for war or other rules related to jus ad bellum. It reflects the
proportionality requirement inherent in determining the legality of any
57
military activity undertaken in the context of an armed conflict.

Modern attempts in the media to mischaracterize the proportionality
principle in violation of the reservations to Protocol I would be
unfounded, as the Rome Statute embedded precisely those elements
as part of the permanent court.
However, the inclusion of a proportionality requirement to mark
off a specific war crime under the Rome Statute is significant for two
reasons. In the first place, the consequence required for conviction of
a grave breach under Protocol I is omitted. The crime is committed
simply by the deliberate initiation of an attack, provided that the
prosecutor can produce evidence sufficient for the finder of fact to
infer that the perpetrator believed that the attack would cause an
anticipated disproportionate result. The actual result is not
necessarily relevant.

As of this writing, the 123 ICC States Party include 33 African nations, 19
55.
from the Asia-Pacific realm, 18 from Eastern Europe, 28 from Latin American and the
Caribbean, and 25 from Western Europe. See The States Party to the Rome Statute,
INT'L CRIM. COuRT,

https://asp.icc-cpi.intlen-menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%

20states%20parties% 20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/PYW9-ZUUC] (archived Feb. 2, 2018).
Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
56.
See Int'l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties First Session
57.
September 2002 at 256 n.36 (Sept. 26, 2002).
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Unlike the grave breach formulation found in Protocol I, the
criminal offense in the Rome Statute is completed based on the
intentional initiation of an unlawful attack. The highest possible
mens rea standard implicitly concedes that some foreseeable civilian
casualties are lawful. Thus, the Rome Statute standard strongly
mitigates against the inference of a criminal intent just based on
evidence sufficient to show that the commander might have had
knowledge that a particular attack might cause some level of damage
to civilians or their property.
In addition, the Elements include an explicit footnote to stipulate
that the perpetrator must intentionally launch the attack (i.e., as a
volitional choice) and do so in the knowledge that the attack would be
expected to cause disproportionate damage. Footnote 37 of the
Elements of Crimes makes plain that the perpetrator's knowledge of
the foreseeably disproportionate effects of an attack requires an
explicit value judgment. The standard for any post hoc assessment of
the action taken by an alleged perpetrator is clear: "As opposed to the
general rule set forth in Paragraph 4 of the General Introduction, this
knowledge element requires that the perpetrator make the value
judgement described herein. An evaluation of that value judgment
must be based on the requisite information available to the
perpetrator at the time."5 8
The Rome Statute crime of disproportionate attack thus widens
the scope of the military advantage that can be considered in the
proportionality analysis (through inclusion of the word overall) and
narrows what level of collateral damage is considered excessive (by
specifying that the damage needs to be clearly excessive to generate
criminal liability). These revisions to the treaty terminology employed
by the drafters of Protocol I could be discounted as an ICC-specific
clause of convenience. In other words, similar to the heated debates
that led to the compromise language related to proportionality in
Protocol I, one might well discount the caveats introduced into the
Rome

Statute

as

a

sui generis necessity

based

on

diplomatic

convenience. But this assumption would be inaccurate.
In fact, the text of the Rome Statute reflects the broadly accepted
view of state practice. To be more precise, the text of the Rome
Statute, as understood in light of the Elements of Crimes text with
explanatory footnotes adopted by consensus, accurately embodies
preexisting customary international law. The language of the United
Kingdom Law of War Manual summarizes the state of the law that
was captured in the prohibition of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) as it should be
understood in light of the Elements of Crimes: 59

58.
59.
87 (2004).

Id. n.37.
THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT T 5.33.5, at
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The military advantage anticipated from the attack refers to the advantage
anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or
particular parts of the attack. The point of this is that an attack may involve a
number of co-ordinated actions, some of which might cause more incidental
damage than others. In assessing whether the proportionality rule has been
violated, the effect of the whole attack must be considered. That does not,
however, mean that an entirely gratuitous and unnecessary action within the
attack as a whole would be condoned. Generally speaking, when considering
the responsibility of a commander at any level, it is necessary to look at the
part of the attack for which he was responsible in the context of the attack as a
whole and in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time the decision
to attack was made.

V. CONCLUSION

Jus in bello in general, and the proportionality principle in
particular, does not operate as a self-justifying and infinitely
malleable framework. Modern articulations of the proportionality
principle deliberately leave a wide margin of discretion to belligerents
as described above. Yet, the textual proportionality provisions of the
applicable treaties (to include the elevated comparative threshold) "do
not appear to be contested by any state, including those that have not
ratified" Protocol 1.60 Public perceptions may see precisely the same
actions from a distance and conclude that the doctrine accords
commanders with more latitude than should be permitted. It often
does not help that the details of the debate are hidden from public
view; nor is there precise popular agreement on the interface between
competing bodies of law and moral principles. More ominously, there
are indicators that international judges and prosecutors may not
appreciate the depth of the discretion when properly applying the
law.
Implications that the modern formulation and application of the
proportionality principle are somehow rooted in a notion that there
are no meaningful constraints on the conduct of hostilities are
nonetheless erroneous. The commonly encountered inference that
military lawyers and the commanders that they serve invoke the law
merely as a subterfuge for unbridled cruelty towards civilians is
unwarranted based on the modern state of the law. The very notion
that the proportionality principle provides sub rosa excuse to justify
mere military convenience runs counter to the very construction of
the law. Moreover, it ignores the normative content of the field, and
in particular the carefully designed balances between military utility
and unbending constraints that are embedded in the fabric of the

field.

60.

KNuT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 168 (2002).

